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While declarations against pecuniary and proprietary interests have
traditionally been regarded as exceptions to the hearsay rule,2 courts have
considered declarations against penal interest less trustworthy and have
generally refused to admit them.3 The traditional justification is that recog-
nition of the penal interest exception would encourage a criminal defendant
to induce a third party to give a false confession.4
The United States Supreme Court first decided not to admit declara-
tions against penal interest in Donnelly v. United States.' The propriety of
excluding such evidence has since been complicated by the Court's decision
in Chambers v. Mississippi,6 In Chambers, the Court held the defendant's right
to a fair trial required that a declaration against penal interest be admitted
if sufficiently trustworthy.7 Since Chambers, the lower courts have struggled
1. 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. en bane 1981).
2. See generall 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1458-1460 (Chadbourn rev.
1974).
3. The first case to consider declarations against penal interest less trustwor-
thy was Sussex Peerage, 11 Cl. & F. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1844). See also C. Mc-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 278 (2d ed. 1972).
4. 623 S.W.2d at 9 n.6. This rationale has been subject to extensive criticism
by commentators and courts. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278
(1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ('no other statement is so much against interest as a
confession of murder"); Scolari v. United States, 406 F.2d 563, 564 (9th Cir.) (testi-
mony must be excluded due to Donnelly's badly reasoned authority), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 981 (1969); United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir.) (exclud-
ing statements against penal interest is an indefensible limitation to the hearsay
exception for statements against interest), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961); 5 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 2, § 1477, at 358; Tague, Rule 804(b)(3), 69 GEo. L.J. 851, 983
n.680 (1981).
5. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
6. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
7. Id at 310. The Supreme Court held that exclusion of a third party's con-
fession to the murder the defendant was charged with denied the defendant his
right to a fair trial. Chambers was charged with murder in Mississippi. McDonald
had confessed to the murder but later denied it. The defense called McDonald as a
witness when the state would not do so. The defense was not allowed to cross-
examine McDonald due to Mississippi's "voucher rule," which prevents a party
from impeaching its own witness. Chambers then tried to introduce the testimony
1
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to determine the level of reliability a statement must have before it invokes
the defendant's constitutional right to demand its admission. The Missouri
Supreme Court first addressed this question in State v. Turner8 and held that
declarations must meet the same level of reliability as was present in Cham-
bers.9 By interpreting Chambers as establishing a mechanical standard of
reliability, the Missouri Supreme Court failed to sufficiently address impor-
tant constitutional issues.
In Turner, Turner and Mitchell robbed a liquor store. Two men were
killed during the robbery, and Turner and Mitchell were each charged with
two counts of capital murder. At his trial, Turner admitted he was at the
scene of the robbery but claimed that Mitchell was responsible for the
murders. Turner attempted to call Michael Cooper as a witness to testify
about admissions made by Mitchell.'o Cooper intended to testify that the
day following the murders, Mitchell, unaware of Cooper's presence, said to
Turner, "I wasted those two punk-ass motherf----s."" Cooper alleged that
Mitchell then saw him and asked if he "knowed who wasted those two
dudes." Cooper also planned to testify that Mitchell made two further ad-
missions to him. The trial judge excluded Cooper's testimony as hearsay,' 2
and Turner was convicted. 3
On appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, the defendant claimed that
the trial court had erred in excluding Cooper's testimony' 4 because exclu-
sion of the declaration against penal interest was unconstitutional under
Chambers. The Missouri Supreme Court held that Chambers did not require
admission of the testimony. 5 The court's analysis was limited to compar-
ing the circumstances surrounding the declarations in Turner with those fac-
tors in Chambers that led the Supreme Court to find the declarations
of three witnesses to whom McDonald had confessed. The trial court excluded the
testimony as hearsay and Chambers was convicted. Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d
217, 220 (Miss. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The Supreme Court held that the
voucher rule in combination with the exclusion of the witnesses' testimony was a
clear denial of the defendant's due process rights. 410 U.S. at 302.
8. 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. en banc 1981).
9. Id at 9.
10. Cooper had testified on behalf of the state at Mitchell's trial. Id at 10.
Mitchell's capital murder convictions were affirmed in State v. Mitchell, 611
S.W.2d 223 (Mo. en banc 1981).
11. 623 S.W.2d at 8.
12. Id
13. Id at 4.
14. Id at 6. The defendant's other allegations of error included (1) insuffi-
ciency of evidence, (2) violation of the cruel and unusual punishment provisions of
the United States and Missouri Constitutions, and (3) erroneous refusal to permit
defense counsel to withdraw. Id None of these allegations were sustained. Id at
13.
15. Id at 10.
[Vol. 48
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DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST
reliable.16 The Chambers Court had listed the circumstances which assured
reliability in that case: (1) the declaration was spontaneous and made to a
close acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred; (2) it was corrobo-
rated by other substantial, reliable evidence; (3) the declarant was aware
that each statement was unquestionably against his interest; and (4) the
declarant was available for cross-examination by the state. 7 In addition to
these circumstances, the Missouri Supreme Court also interpreted Chambers
to require that the declarant's complicity exonerate the accused.18
The Missouri Supreme Court found that two of the Chambers factors
were not met: there was not the same degree of corroborating evidence and
the declarations would not clearly exonerate Turner.19 Although the court
held that a declaration against penal interest must be admitted where sub-
stantial indicia of reliability appear and the declarant's statement exoner-
ates the accused, it stated that the dangers of admitting extrajudicial
confessions "militate[d] against extending the rule of Chambers beyond the
facts presented there."2 ° Since the level of reliability present in Chambers
was not met, the court concluded that the declarations were properly
excluded.2"
Prior to Turner, Missouri courts consistently held that declarations
against penal interest were inadmissible in criminal proceedings, 22 but this
16. Id at 9.
17. 410 U.S. at 300-01.
18. 623 S.W.2d at 9. Although the Turner court required the statement to fully
exonerate the accused and relied on Chambers as the source of this requirement, the
Chambers Court did not specify this as one of the factors considered in reaching its
decision. See 410 U.S. at 300-01. Other courts that have adopted the Chambers fac-
tors as the definitive test in determining the trustworthiness of a statement have not
indicated that exoneration is required. See, e.g., United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d
316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Guillete, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977); United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 316 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); People v. Foster, 66 Ill. App. 3d 292, 294-95,
383 N.E.2d 788, 789 (1978).
19. 623 S.W.2d at 9. The Turner court also noted that the declarant was un-
available, whereas in Chambers the declarant was available. While this weighed
against the defendant in determining whether the declaration should be admitted,
it is doubtful that the Chambers Court intended availability to be a factor. Turner
was interpreted by a subsequent Missouri decision as not requiring availability.
State v. Carroll, 629 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981). In United States v.
Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974), the court of appeals applied the Chambers
test and found the declaration against penal interest admissible although the de-
clarant was unavailable. The court stated that the general rule allowing admission
of statements against penal interest recognizes as a prerequisite the unavailability of
the declarant. Id at 958 n.5.
20. 623 S.W.2d at 9.
21. Id at 10.
22. Id at 8. Missouri has not adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
The rule is set forth in note 35 infra.
1983]
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exclusion has never been clearly justified by Missouri courts. Early Mis-
souri cases dealing with the subject stated simply that declarations admit-
ting criminal acts were hearsay and therefore inadmissible.2 3 Subsequently,
in Suter v. Easterly,24 a civil case, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized
the declaration against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule.25
Nevertheless, after Suter, in State v. Brown, 26 the supreme court held that
statements against penal interest offered by the defendant were excluda-
ble.27 Although the defendant relied on Suter, the court stated a number of
bases for inadmissibility and noted that the general rule in criminal cases
excludes statements admitting criminal acts.28 Although Missouri courts
finally recognized such admissions as declarations against interest, they con-
tinued to exclude them in criminal cases, based only on Missouri
precedent.29
In Turner, the court realized it could no longer exclude such statements
merely because they were hearsay.3 ° Under Chambers, even hearsay state-
ments are admissible if their exclusion would violate the defendant's right
to a fair trial. Turner's interpretation of Chambers was that the right to a fair
trial was violated only if the declaration excluded had the same degree of
reliability as the evidence in Chambers.3 In Chambers, however, the Court
stated that the testimony before it "bore persuasive assurances of trustwor-
thiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception for dec-
larations against interest."3 2 In addition, the Court claimed that it was not
23. See State v. Williams, 309 Mo. 155, 177, 274 S.W. 427, 433 (1925) (third
party's admissions hearsay and inadmissible); State v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 99, 23
S.W. 1089, 1091 (1893) (evidence was mere hearsay and clearly inadmissible); State
v. Duncan, 116 Mo. 288, 311, 22 S.W. 699, 705 (1893) (evidence "wholly inadmissi-
ble. . .[as] the merest hearsay"); State v. Evans, 55 Mo. 460, 461 (1874) (evidence
was mere hearsay and under no circumstances admissible).
24. 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945).
25. Id at 295-94, 189 S.W.2d at 289-90.
26. 404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966).
27. Id. at 185.
28. Id The court stated that Easterlv required unavailability, while the declar-
ant in Brown was available. The court also found that the declaration was merely
cumulative.
29. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 560 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977). The
Grant court discussed the criticism of the traditional rule of excluding declarations
against penal interest but noted that Missouri courts still excluded them in criminal
cases. The court avoided the issue by concluding that even if it were to extend the
exception to criminal cases, the offered declaration would be inadmissible due to an
insufficient foundation. Id at 42-43. See also State v. Invisivices, 604 S.W.2d 773,
780 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (Missouri courts still refuse to recognize declarations
against penal interest as hearsay exception in criminal cases).
30. 623 S.W.2d at 8-9.
31. Id at 9.
32. 410 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 48
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establishing new principles of constitutional law. 33 These statements imply
that the constitutional analysis used to determine whether evidence must be
admitted does not depend upon the specific factors set forth in Chambers. By
adopting the standard of reliability in Chambers to determine admissibility,
Turner failed to address the possibility that the right to a fair trial may
demand admission of less reliable declarations. 34
Courts throughout the United States have struggled with the constitu-
tional limitation imposed on their rules of evidence by Chambers. Since the
federal courts must apply Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), their deci-
sions on the reliability required are not helpful. Rule 804(b)(3) requires
that declarations against penal interest be admitted where corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness, 35 but the degree of corrobo-
ration required is unclear.36 Thus, some courts use the Chambers factors as a
guide to determine whether statements are sufficiently trustworthy,3 7 while
others do not require the level of reliability found in Chambers for admissi-
bility under Rule 804(b)(3).3 8 A number of states also have adopted Rule
804(b)(3), which complicates their courts' interpretation of Chambers.39
States that traditionally have applied rules of evidence similarly to
Missouri interpret Chambers differently.' In People v. Tate,4 the Illinois
33. Id
34. See Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an
Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U.L. REv. 148 (1976).
35. "A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and of-
fered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
36. See Lowery v. Maryland, 401 F. Supp. 604, 607 (D. Md. 1975) ("Except to
indicate that simple corroboration is not enough, no clues are given as to what
constitutes corroborating circumstances.").
37. In United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated:
"To guide our review we turn to the Supreme Court's decision in Chambers, which
sets forth four general considerations relevant to an investigation of third party con-
fessions." Id at 754. See also United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 232 (4th
Cir. 1982) (Chambers ruling is in large measure codified in Rule 804(b)(3)).
38. In United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978), the court held a
statement admissible where the statement was spontaneous, a United States magis-
trate was a witness, the declarant had no motive to falsify, and it was against his
interest to make the statement. The court did not mention the Chambers factors in
its analysis. Id. at 290. Accord United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th
Cir. 1974) (implying that Chambers only requires corroborating circumstances which
give "aura of trustworthiness" to statement); cf. United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d
244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976) (district court should "be mindful of the possible relation-
ship between Chambers and 804(b)(3)").
39. A thorough examination of Rule 804(b)(3) is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a list of states that have adopted some form of Rule 804(b) (3), see 4 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804-114, -264 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
40. A number of state courts have held declarations against penal interest ad-
missible as a common law exception to the hearsay rule and so do not have to
19831
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Supreme Court held that an out-of-court confession by a defense witness
was not admissible. The court "adopted the language of Chambers" and
recognized that Chambers required admissibility in certain circumstances.
42
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that Chambers only requires admission of
statements having the same type of corroboration found in Chambers.4 3 The
court found that although the declarant in Tate was at trial and could be
cross-examined, other indicia of reliability were not present." This is simi-
lar to the narrow interpretation of Chambers given by the Missouri Supreme
Court.
Strict application was reemphasized by the Illinois Appellate Court in
People v. Petrovic. After examining the four Chambers factors, the court
stated that "Illinois courts have excluded statements as hearsay where any
one or more of these factors has been absent."4 6 Thus Illinois courts have
applied Chambers even more rigidly than the Missouri Supreme Court. This
analysis calls into question the constitutionality of requiring the same de-
gree of reliability as in Chambers before admitting the declaration.
4 7
By contrast, the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Hack-
ett48 interpreted Chambers to require an analysis of the facts of the case to
determine whether due process was violated.4 9 Although earlier Penn-
sylvania courts had held that declarations against penal interest were inad-
missible,50 the Hackett court realized it was compelled to update the law in
light of Chambers.5 However, the Pennsylvania court established its own
decide whether the constitution requires such statements to be admitted. See, e.g.,
People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964); State v.
Leong, 51 Hawaii 581, 465 P.2d 560 (1970); People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 242
N.W.2d 739 (1976); People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d
825 (1970); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
41. 87 11. 2d 134, 429 N.E.2d 470 (1981).
42. Id at 144, 429 N.E.2d at 475.
43. Id at 145, 429 N.E.2d at 476.
44. Id
45. 102 Ill. App. 3d 282, 430 N.E.2d 6 (1982).
46. Id at 290, 430 N.E.2d at 12.
47. The Connecticut Supreme Court follows an analysis similar to that of Illi-
nois. See State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 431 A.2d 501, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920
(1980); State v. De Freitas, 179 Conn. 431, 426 A.2d 799 (1980); Note, Third Party
Declarations Against Penal Interest, 14 CONN. L. REV. 173 (1981).
48. 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973). The defendant in Hackett was
charged with drug addiction, but he asserted that he had been involuntarily
drugged. The trial court refused to admit the testimony of a witness who claimed
the declarant admitted he drugged the defendant's soda. The defendant claimed a
denial of due process based on Chambers. Id at 23-28, 307 A.2d at 335-37.
49. Id at 29-30, 307 A.2d at 338.
50. Commonwealth v. Somershoe, 217 Pa. Super. 156, 269 A.2d 149 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Honigman, 216 Pa. Super. 303, 264 A.2d 424 (1970).
51. 225 Pa. Super. at 27, 307 A.2d at 337.
[Vol. 48
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss3/9
DECLARA TIONS AGAINST INTEREST
level for mandatory admission. 2 The court found that the declaration
under consideration met the standard of reliability it had established; thus
its exclusion denied the defendant a fair opportunity to defend himself.5 3
The court noted that "[t]he protection of innocent defendants must over-
ride any technical adherence to a policy that excludes evidence on the
grounds of hearsay."5 4
The Pennsylvania court interpreted Chambers as forbidding exclusion of
declarations against penal interest without analyzing the facts of the indi-
vidual case to determine whether the defendant is deprived of a fair trial.
Without determining whether the court's factual analysis in Hackett led to a
constitutional result,55 it is clear the court did at least succeed in addressing
the constitutionality of excluding the defendant's evidence.
In State v. Higginbotham,56 the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the
issue perhaps even more successfully. Rather than establishing a set of reli-
ability factors, the Minnesota court stated that "the declaration against pe-
nal interest must be proven trustworthy by independent corroborating
evidence that bespeaks reliability."5 7 Although the declaration in Hz;gginbat-
ham was excluded, the court analyzed the facts of the case to reach this
decision rather than inquiring whether the level of reliability in Chambers
had been met.
The Minnesota court also pointed out that the Chambers Court had
acknowledged that hearsay could be excluded if there was a basis for doubt-
ing its trustworthiness. 58 In Higginbotham, the declarant gave his confession
at 2:30 a.m., then broke down, and claimed he was on LSD when he gave
the confession. Eyewitness evidence also discredited the trustworthiness of
the confession, and the declarant was "like a brother" to the defendant.
The court concluded that evidence was "demonstrably incredible hearsay,"
and that to admit it would constitute a "fraud on the public."5 9 By inter-
preting Chambers as it did, the court was able to reach the constitutional
issue and determine at what point the defendant's right to a fair trial re-
quires a hearsay statement to be admitted in his favor.
Since the factors established in Chambers were not presented by the
Supreme Court as the standard required for admissibility, lower courts
52. Id at 29-30, 307 A.2d at 338. In order for the statement to be admissible,
Hackett appears to require that it exculpate the defendant, be written or made
orally to reliable persons of authority or those having adverse interests to the declar-
ant, and be made before trial or during the trial itself.
53. Id
54. Id
55. The required standard for admissibility appears to be even more stringent
than Chambers and would therefore be unconstitutional.
56. 298 Minn. 1, 212 N.W.2d 881 (1973).
57. Id at 5, 212 N.W.2d at 883.
58. Id
59. Id at 6, 212 N.W.2d at 883.
1983)
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must decide when the Constitution requires that evidence be admitted.
There are two constitutional limits on the degree of reliability a court can
require: the defendant's right to a fair trial and the defendant's right to
introduce material evidence in his favor to the jury.6" Since the traditional
role of the jury is to weigh relevant evidence, "the trial judge's role should
be limited to a threshold determination of the probability of trustworthi-
ness."6 1 It has been asserted that a declaration against penal interest is
sufficiently trustworthy if (1) the declarant recognizes the potential of jeop-
ardizing his liberty, (2) the statement is against penal interest when made,
(3) the declarant would reasonably perceive the disserving quality of the
statement, (4) the part of the statement that exculpates the defendant is
related to the part of the statement that is against the declarant's interest,
(5) there is no probable motive to falsify, and (6) the declarant acted rea-
sonably when he gave the statement.62 State courts that admit declarations
against penal interest under the common law exception for declarations
against interest are recognizing that these factors are inherent in declara-
tions against penal interest, making them as reliable as declarations against
a material interest.63 These courts do not require any additional founda-
tion of reliability.'
In Turner, the Missouri Supreme Court required a pre-admissibility
foundation of total exoneration and sufficient corroboration to achieve ab-
solute reliability. This foundation requirement appears to usurp the jury's
function.
A defendant's guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.65
When the defendant attempts to introduce a declarant's admission of guilt,
however, that declarant's guilt should not have to be established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some courts appear to require corroboration in order to
establish the declarant's guilt; yet even without corroboration the declara-
tion in Turner would have raised a reasonable suspicion that the declarant,
not the defendant, had committed the crime.6" Since a defendant need
only create a reasonable doubt in the jurors' minds to justify acquittal, a
declaration which could exculpate the defendant should be admitted when
it is reasonably possible that the declarant committed the crime. 67 By re-
60. The distinction between the compulsory process and due process clauses is
made in Westen, The Compulsoy Process Clause, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 71, 150 (1974).
61. See Note, supra note 34, at 155.
62. Id See also Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 58 HARV. L. REv. 1, 52-53 (1944); Note, supra note 47, at 184.
63. See cases cited note 40 supra.
64. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 565, 242 N.W.2d 739, 745
(1976) ("We are of the opinion that the circumstances surrounding the making or
reporting of a third-party statement. . . go to the weight to be given the testimony,
not its admissibility.").
65. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
66. See Note, supra note 34, at 175.
67. See id at 176.
[Vol. 48
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quiring that degree of corroboration found in Chambers, the Turner court
excluded evidence that could have raised this reasonable doubt.
The Turner court assumed that confessions without a high degree of
corroboration are inherently unreliable and that the only way to avoid mis-
leading the jury is to exclude them. This assumption conflicts with the
jury's role; a defendant has the right to introduce material evidence in his
favor "unless the state can demonstrate that the jury is incapable of deter-
mining its weight and credibility and that the only way to ensure the integ-
rity of the trial is to exclude the evidence altogether."'  Where the jury has
a rational basis for evaluating the truth, its role is improperly restricted by
requirements of additional corroboration.
6 9
The second constitutional limitation the Turner court failed to address
is the defendant's right to a fair trial. This constitutional right was consid-
ered in Hackett and Hgginbotham, where the courts analyzed the facts to
decide whether the evidence was so reliable that due process required its
admission. In Turner, however, the court merely stated that due process
requires "fundamental fairness essential to the very concept ofjustice" and
summarily held that due process had not been violated.7"
In certain circumstances, rules of evidence must yield to the defend-
ant's right to present evidence. In Washington v. Texas, 7 Fuller and Wash-
ington were charged with murder. Fuller had been convicted, and
Washington sought to introduce Fuller's testimony at his trial. Fuller
planned to testify that he was responsible for the murder. The trial court
excluded the testimony based on two Texas statutes prohibiting co-conspir-
ators from testifying for each other.72 Washington was convicted, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed,73 the United States Supreme Court
reversed and held that the defendant had the right to call Fuller as a wit-
ness.74 The Court held that the fourteenth amendment due process clause75
incorporated the sixth amendment compulsory process clause,76 therefore
68. Westen, supra note 60, at 159.
69. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 396 Mich. 551, 565, 242 N.W.2d 739, 745
(1976) (corroboration relevant to weight of testimony, not admissibility); Hines v.
Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 747, 117 S.W. 843, 848 (1923) ("even a bare confes-
sion ought to go to the jury for what they may consider it worth"); 9c. United States
v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir.) (judge's determination of admission
based on witness's credibility may interfere with the jury's role), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
840 (1978).
70. 623 S.W.2d at 10.
71. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
72. Id at 18. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 82 (Vernon 1925) (repealed 1965);
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 711 (Vernon 1925) (repealed 1965).
73. Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), rev'd,
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
74, 388 U.S. at 17-19.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
1983]
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the sixth amendment was applicable to the states.77 The compulsory pro-
cess clause encompasses the right to offer testimony of witnesses and to com-
pel their attendance. The Court stated that since a defendant has a
constitutional right to present a defense, legislatures and courts cannot arbi-
trarily exclude whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the
presumption that they are unworthy of belief.78 Chambers followed Washing-
ton and indicated that lower courts must analyze the facts in each case to
determine whether the right to a fair trial requires evidence to be
admitted.79
Six years later, the Court repeated this analysis in Green v. Georgia." In
Green, the defendant, charged with murder, attempted to admit the testi-
mony of a witness during the sentencing stage of the trial. The witness
alleged that a co-defendant had admitted committing the murder.8 1 Like
the witness in Turner, this witness's testimony had aided the state in convict-
ing the co-defendant.8 " The Georgia Supreme Court upheld exclusion of
the testimony, distinguishing Chambers on the basis that the testimony in
Green was to be admitted during the sentencing stage, not the guilt stage.
In addition, the court held that the evidence in Green would not have totally
exonerated the defendant.
8 3
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed,8 4 implicitly re-
jecting the distinctions made by the lower court.85 Apparently, the stage of
admission and the absence of total exoneration were immaterial. The fac-
tors indicating reliability were examined in connection with the defendant's
right to a fair trial; the Court determined that testimony sufficiently reliable
to convict the co-defendant was reliable enough to be admitted on Green's
behalf.8
6
These Supreme Court cases indicate the direction the Missouri
Supreme Court should have taken in Turner. In Washington, the Court held
enjoy the right to. . . have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
77. 388 U.S. at 18-19.
78. Id at 23.
79. 410 U.S. at 300-02.
80. 422 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
81. Id at 96.
82. See Turner, 623 S.W.2d at 10.
83. Green v. State, 242 Ga. 261, 271-72, 249 S.E.2d 1, 8-9 (1978), rev'd, 442 U.S.
95 (1979).
84. 442 U.S. at 97.
85. The dissent in Turner noted that by reversing the Georgia Supreme Court,
the United States Supreme Court had demonstrated that it was not essential that
the statement be introduced at a particular stage of the proceedings or that it to-
tally exonerate the defendant in order to be admissible. 623 S.W.2d at 17 (Bardg-
ett, J., dissenting).
86. 442 U.S. at 97.
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that exclusion of evidence based on a presumption of untrustworthiness vio-
lated the defendant's right to present a defense.87 Yet in Turner, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court excluded evidence based on the presumption that
unless it met the Chambers factors it was unreliable.8 8 The court should
have followed Chambers and analyzed whether, in light of the specific facts
and circumstances, the defendant's right to compulsory process required the
admission of the evidence.
As Judge Bardgett pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Turner, if
the court's analysis had focused on specific facts, it would have been influ-
enced by the Green decision.89 He argued that Green was not distinguishable
from Turner on the ground that the testimony in Turner was to be admitted
at sentencing rather than at trial or that the testimony would not have
totally exonerated the defendant.' These are the specific distinctions the
Court rejected in Green.
The dissent also contended that the circumstances indicated that the
declarations bore the assurances of reliability found in Green and Chambers.
More specifically, the dissent asserted that the "evidence Turner wanted to
introduce was the most powerful evidence used by the state to convict the
declarant."9 ' Green held that testimony admissible on behalf of the state in
an earlier criminal prosecution was sufficiently reliable to be admitted on
behalf of the defendant.9 2 As the Turner dissent emphasized, the state relied
almost totally on the declaration to prove the declarant's guilt; one could
hardly find a more convincing expression of reliability.93 If the Missouri
Supreme Court had analyzed the facts, Green indicates that the court should
have admitted the testimony to insure the defendant his right to a fair trial.
The Turner court failed to analyze the constitutional implications of
excluding declarations against penal interest less reliable than those in
Chambers. Turner also ignored the inference in Chambers that courts may be
constitutionally required to admit less trustworthy statements. The court
should have used the Hackett and Higginbotham approach and determined
whether the statement was so unreliable that exclusion did not violate the
defendant's right to a fair trial. Although this analysis might place untrust-
worthy evidence in the jury's hands, this is consistent with the jury's role as
factfinder. Instead, Missouri courts are left with a decision which failed to
extend the constitutional analysis beyond the factors in Chambers. The con-
stitutional principles which the United States Supreme Court left to lower
87. 388 U.S. at 23.
88. 623 S.W.2d at 13.
89. Id. at 17 (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
90. Id
91. Id
92. 442 U.S. at 97.
93. 623 S.W.2d at 17 (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
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courts to refine have been further delegated by the Missouri Supreme Court
to the lower courts of Missouri.
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